Afghanistan Withdrawal Memo

 

To: President Biden

From: Craig Myers, EmmaJean Anjoorian, Camden Krasinski, and Ian Anderson, Policy Advisors

Date: 02/20/2022

RE: Afghanistan Withdrawal

Issue:

After the failed withdrawal of United States (U.S.) troops from Afghanistan in late August 2021 and the disastrous events that followed, recent analysis has confirmed that the Biden Administration could have better decisions in the interests of all when withdrawing from Afghanistan.

Executive Summary:  

Following the Biden administration's complete withdrawal from Afghanistan on September 11^th, 2021, the ensuing humanitarian crisis and loss of U.S. investment led to outcry from U.S. public and international observers. The United States shouldn't use its mass resources to support themselves, but also others; by leaving Afghanistan in a rash fashion, the Biden Administration created the possibility for a refugee and humanitarian crisis.  President Trump signed an agreement in 2020 which laid out the framework for a U.S. withdrawal from the region under the impression the Taliban and Afghanistan government would implement a permeant ceasefire, the Taliban later broke this agreement.  This memo looks to lay out the options in the months leading up to the mass exodus and abandonment of the US and allied forces position and make a critical analysis of them as to provide a more satisfactory resolution to this 20-year conflict. In this memorandum, we intend to highlight three possible options the Biden Administration could have taken that would have resulted in a better outcome for U.S. including 1) listening to other government agencies 2) staying in Afghanistan to continue supporting its Democratic Consolidation and 3) engaging in a slower withdrawal to allow for democratization to continue while slowly dissolving U.S. involvement.

Relevant National Interests:

As the world becomes more interconnected, both domestic and international security serve as a top priority for every country. As the U.S. stands as one of the world’s strongest states, the U.S. should use its resources to not only benefit itself but others as well. The aftermath of the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in late August 2021 remains of relevant interest to the U.S. for numerous reasons. The refugee and humanitarian crises created from the withdrawal concerns the U.S. on both a moral and domestic perspective. The U.S. has already aided in evacuating the refugees however many refugees remain in Afghanistan.[i] The people left behind from the withdrawal pose a humanitarian crisis as multiple issues, such as women’s rights and rule of law, now fall under threat.[ii] When the U.S. entered Afghanistan, they implicitly made a commitment to the security of the Afghan people, and hence need to follow through with that commitment. The refugee crisis also effects the U.S. domestically as the U.S. now must use its resources to aid the refugees who have come to the U.S. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has also poses an international security threat. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could lead to a renewal of a terrorist threat.[iii] This effects U.S. security as they now must exert their resources to monitor an additional threat. A possible conflict may harm the U.S. and the world order.

Analysis:

            On October 7, 2001, President Bush declared that the United States would start to strike, "al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan."[iv]  This statement came weeks after congress passed a law which allowed the president to, "[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons..."[v]  This authorization gave the President full, unrestricted access to the United States military whether or not Congress approved the conflict. More recently, on February 29, 2020, the United States and Afghanistan signed the Doha agreement which laid out the plan for a United States withdrawal from Afghanistan.[vi]  In exchange for the US withdrawing from the country, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would, "prevent the use of the soil of Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States and its allies."[vii]  The agreement also laid out steps for continuing talks between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) and the (now defunct) Afghanistan government;[viii] these 'continuing talks' between the Taliban and the Afghanistan included a "permanent and comprehensive ceasefire."[ix] Although the Doha agreement laid out a United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, it remains prudent to recognize that the Taliban implicitly violated this agreement when they committed war crimes and started attacking civilians and members of the Afghanistan government.[x]  By this breach of the agreement, the United States was no longer obligated to withdraw by the date set out in the agreement.  Despite this, the Biden Administration continued with the withdrawal and Afghanistan fell to the Taliban within 11 days.

Strategic Options:

            Listening to Governmental Agencies

Although President Biden has the authority to make decisions regarding the troops in Afghanistan, Biden’s decision could have been more well-informed if he had listened to other governmental agencies. Having Biden listen to other government agencies ensures that Biden makes the best, most informed decision, regarding all aspects of the operation. No one person can have all the expertise regarding the subject, therefore not one person should make the decision. One such government agency, who would have provided valuable info had Biden met with him, is military general McKenzie. On Tuesday, September 28, 2021, Senators questioned, in an armed services committee hearing, General McKenzie, et al. In this hearing, General McKenzie stated that, in his opinion, keeping 2,500 US troops in the country in order to prevent the collapse of the Afghan government.  McKenzie stated, “my view is that 2,500 was an appropriate number to remain and that if we went below that number, in fact, we would probably witness a collapse of the Afghan government and the Afghan military.”[xi] Had Biden listened and applied what General McKenzie said, his decision would have differed vastly from the decision he made. A decent number of troops would have remained in Afghanistan, which would have provided security, preventing both the refugee crisis and the humanitarian crisis. With this option however, the U.S. would have to continue spending resources on the troops in Afghanistan.

Stay and Continue to Support Democratic Consolidation

Another option would be that of an international peacekeeper and to continue existing efforts to build the government while maintaining a presence in the region. This would be the fulfillment of our 2001 mission into the region (under the AUMF) and would represent a satisfactory return on our taxpayer investment in successfully ridding the region terrorist training camps and instituting a democratic regime. While this option has its pros, it gives the appearance to the public of staying in a ‘never-ending war’ since our diplomacy relies heavily on our military presence in the region; the support for a ‘never-ending war’ is largely unpopular both domestically in the U.S. and internationally.  The issue of whether or not to stay in Afghanistan is displayed center stage on the political front of the U.S. as the American public most recently voted to prioritize domestic spending over our ballooning domestic agenda.

A Slower Withdrawal 

Our last option would involve a slower withdrawal from Afghanistan, would also have served as a more beneficial decision. When the United States decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, many warned that the country could once again become a safe harbor for terrorist groups and organizations. The Afghanistan Study Group of the United States Institute of Peace warned that, “a precipitous withdrawal could lead to a reconstitution of the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland within eighteen months to three years.”[xii] Since the Taliban already violated the Doha agreement regarding the cease-fire, the possibility that they may allow for more violence to emerge stands strong. A slow withdrawal allows the US to make clearer its mission of a terrorist-free Afghanistan and ensures its enforceability by improving upon the wording of the agreement. A slower withdrawal would also allow the U.S. to evacuate more people to safety and avoid a humanitarian crisis. However, a slower withdrawal would also allow for a prolonged fight, risking more casualties.

Recommendation:

Our recommendation is to engage in a slow, strategic withdrawal and promote democracy building and inter-Afghanistan talks.  

Implementation:

·      Re-open inter-Afghan negotiations with the U.S. and Foreign Partners leave International Observers on the ground to validate a peaceful transition of power or coexistence.

·      Re-negotiate the Doha agreement as to be more metric focused and less time oriented (robbing U.S and allies of strategic advantage).

·      Ensure that all U.S. citizens and the 18,000 Afghans who applied for SIVs (Special Immigrant Visa's) are safely out of the country before fully withdrawing.[xiii]

·      Ensure that the United States doesn't leave mass munition stockpiles and technology to fall into unknown hands.

Talking Points:

·      The United States began the process of Democratic consolidation process therefore allowing US troops to stay there for the near future would continue to support that consolidation while slowly withdrawing.

·      The United States thinks this is the best option because it can ensure that the tax-payers money hasn't been wasted.

·      It will allow the Biden Administration to deliver on a campaign promise of withdrawing from Afghanistan without creating further instability in the region that would result from a precipitous exit.

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[i] The American Journal of International Law, "United States Grapples with the Aftermath of Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Use of Force, Arms Control, and Non-proliferation, (2022).

[ii] Hillevi Pihl, "The American Withdrawal from Afghanistan," (2022).

[iii] Max Boot, "Biden's 9/11 Withdrawal From Afghanistan: What to Know", Council on Foreign Relations, (2021).

[iv] George W. Bush, "Presidential Address to the Nation" (2001), President's Remarks

[v] Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, (2001).

[vi] See US Institute of Peace, "ANNEX 6 Text of the Doha Agreement", (2021), p. 79

[vii] See Id., p. 77

[viii] See Idem.

[ix] See Idem.

[x] See Amnesty International, "War Crimes and Civilian Harm During the Fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban," (2021), pp. 13–21

[xi] Committee on Armed Services, and Kenneth McKenzie. Report, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Conclusion of Military Operations in Afghanistan and Plans for Future Counterterrorism Operations § (2021), p. 69.

[xii] Ayotte, Kelly A., Joseph F. Dunford, Nancy Lindborg, Nisha Biswal, James Dobbins, Joe Donnelly, Michèle Flournoy, et al. Rep. Afghanistan Study Group Final Report. Washington, DC, 2021, p. 22

[xiii] The American Journal of International Law, "United States Grapples with the Aftermath of Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Use of Force, Arms Control, and Non-proliferation, (2022), p. 193.

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Bibliography:

Hammond, Joseph, and Aynur Bashirova. “Afghanization and the Prompt Collapse of a Nation.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2022, 88–92.

Boot, Max. “Biden’s 9/11 Withdrawal From Afghanistan: What to Know.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31147.Pihl, Hillevi. “The American Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” 2022.

Pihl, Hillevi. “The American Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” 2022.

“United States Grapples with Aftermath of Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” The American Journal of International Law 116, no. 1 (2022): 190–97. https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/ajil.2021.68.

Third Way. “2020 Country Brief: Afghanistan.” Third Way, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26160.

 

Schweitzer, Yoram, and Oded Eran. “The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan Portends a Vacuum and Uncertain Future.” Institute for National Security Studies, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33820.

Bush, George W. “Presidential Address to the Nation.” District of Columbia: Washington, October 7, 2001.

US Institute of Peace. “ANNEX 6 Text of the Doha Agreement.” Doha: Doha, 2021.

Rep. No Escape: War Crimes and Civilian Harm During the Fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban. Amnesty International, 2021.

Cooper, H., & Schmitt, E. (2021, September 28). Military Officials Say They Urged Biden Against Afghanistan Withdrawal. The New York Times. Retrieved February 20, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/28/us/politics/milley-senate-hearing-afghanistan.html?unlocked_article_code=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACEIPuomT1JKd6J17Vw1cRCfTTMQmqxCdw_PIxftm3iWna3DEDmwSiPkORJCH_0bRZKF4IN4y2zCWVZpaPbkmWPE3zuJWJU1rREyhrJSEkZIEODk8r8SzQmYyldrrbIwPzAXLPCO_Ofstg_q2pQ6HOzy9RqTZ1nN1LA8yvZdmd1y13XZYzrOWEeIhxtEt3asgD5l6FzoDZTKY_KW9U2UIM92AbhHX6QM1U_gIGm2A2I7BtM9TNVlaGlnET3hg4G0j69o6ONMfP6n3KhBIa9OpyPxKSTQudNH1csV3E4vElLxqsqrPqwiMy6e1z_Y2E6ZSutDUozZjq69a1DNGw6xnZoekk2c&smid=url-share.

Committee on Armed Services, and Kenneth McKenzie. Report, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Conclusion of Military Operations in Afghanistan and Plans for Future Counterterrorism Operations § (2021).

Ayotte, Kelly A., Joseph F. Dunford, Nancy Lindborg, Nisha Biswal, James Dobbins, Joe Donnelly, Michèle Flournoy, et al. Rep. Afghanistan Study Group Final Report. Washington, DC, 2021.